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ACausal Contributions and Liability*
Victor Tadros
This article explores the extent to which the magnitude of harm that a person is
liable to suffer to avert a threat depends on the magnitude of her causal contri-
bution to the threat. Several different versions of this view are considered. The
conclusions are mostly skeptical—facts that may determine how large of a causal
contribution a person makes to a threat are not morally significant, or not suffi-
ciently significant to make an important difference to liability. However, under-
standing ways in which causation may be scalar helps to deepen our understand-
ing of other morally significant facts, such as responsibility.Many just war theorists believe that at least one ground of a person’s lia-
bility to be harmed to avert an unjust threat is her moral responsibility
for causing the threat. If a person is liable to be harmed to avert a threat,
that person lacks a right not to be harmed to avert that threat. Harming
that person to avert the threat does not wrong that person, and this makes
a significant difference to the permissibility of harming that person. Thus,
the view under consideration implies that whether a person causes an un-
just threat determines whether it is permissible to harm that person.
Suppose this is true. Does the magnitude of a person’s causal contri-
bution to a threat make a difference to liability? If causation grounds li-
ability and causal contributions are scalar, it is initially plausible that lia-
bility depends on the magnitude of the causal contribution a person
makes to a threat. Some just war theorists rely on this idea to support a
reasonably general, if not uniform, principle of noncombatant immunity.
This issue has great practical importance. Causal contributions seem
to vary widely across combatants and noncombatants. Combatants in the* Earlier versions of this article were presented at Stockholm University, Oxford Uni-
versity, and a workshop on causation, responsibility, and war in Catania. I am grateful to the
participants at those events, and especially to Tom Dougherty, Cécile Fabre, Helen Frowe,
Alex Kaiserman, Carolina Sartorio, and Adam Slavny, as well as two referees and the asso-
ciate editors of Ethics. I am grateful to the Leverhulme Trust for a Major Research Fellow-
ship that supported the writing of this article.
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Asame unit as the combatants who directly pose threats support their mis-
sions with navigational and tactical advice, they encourage combatants to
pose these threats, they help to load weapons and identify targets, and so
on. Combatants beyond the unit also contribute—without them the war
would not have occurred, they secure the territory from which further ad-
vances can be made, they divert threats away from the unit, they provide
intelligence, they provide a disciplinary hierarchy which makes the war
machine more effective, and so on. Pilots, drivers, medics, caterers, and
administrators contribute to the infrastructure of war, both at home and
abroad. And wars are conducted only because of the large-scale civilian ef-
fort that supports them: manufacturing munitions and vehicles, military
training, building roads, developing weapons, sending food and clothing,
gathering and assessing intelligence, providing moral support, voting for
the war, governing it, and so on, are all essential to the war effort.
To assess whether causal contribution matters, and if so, how, we
need a clearer understanding of how causal contributions are scalar, if
they are. This will allow us to judge whether any facts that make them
scalar are morally significant. As there are many causal theories, there
are many possibilities.
My main aim is not to determine whether, or how, causal contribu-
tions are scalar. It is to assess the implications of different ideas about
how causal contributions might be scalar for liability to defensive harm.
My conclusions are mostly skeptical. In most cases, facts that might make
causal contribution scalar are morally irrelevant. In some cases where
they are relevant, the facts that might make a causal contribution scalar
are already well recognized as relevant to liability. In that case, the view
that liability depends on the magnitude of a person’s causal contribution
may deepen our understanding of familiar ideas, but it does not provide
a new character on the moral landscape. There are some cases where my
conclusions are more complex. None of the ideas I consider significantly
supports a reasonably general principle of noncombatant immunity. Of
course, that does not show that there is no such principle, only that it is
not grounded in differences in causal contribution.
Section I outlines the role that causal contribution has played in just
war theory. Section II makes some clarificatory and methodological re-
marks. Section III considers the idea that a person might contribute part
of a threat rather than a whole threat. Section IV focuses on the idea that
a person might contribute part of the cause rather than the whole cause.
Section V is concerned with the idea that the magnitude of a person’s
causal contribution to a threat depends on the relationship between the
threat and features of personhood. SectionVI considers the distinction be-
tween enabling and direct causation. Section VII explores David Lewis’s
counterfactual account of degrees of causal contribution. SectionVIII con-
sidersoverdeterminationandpreemptioncases. Section IXevaluates prob-This content downloaded from 035.176.047.006 on January 22, 2018 03:41:13 AM
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Aabilistic theories of causation. Section X explores proximity and remote-
ness.
I. CAUSAL CONTRIBUTIONS IN JUST WAR THEORY
Several just war theorists, such as Cécile Fabre, Jeff McMahan, and Seth
Lazar, rely on the idea that liability to be harmed depends on the mag-
nitude of causal contribution to support a general, if not uniform, prin-
ciple of noncombatant immunity.
Fabre argues that a person who contributes to a wrongful venture
resulting in unjust lethal threats is liable to be killed to avert those
threats only if her causal contribution meets some threshold. She writes,1
61. Se
and C
2
ll use A contribution must, on its own individual terms, meet a threshold
of causal significance in order for its author to be liable. Tightening
screws on tank engines, testing the sweat-absorbing capacities of the
clothes which soldiers will wear in the desert, and adjusting the
speed level of food packaging machines do not, it seems to me, pass
the threshold. Nor, for that matter, does designing a tiny piece of
equipment which goes into a gun do so. By contrast, taking overall
responsibility for negotiating and drafting sales contracts between
one’s factory and the army might; so might driving a truckload of
munitions or protective clothing to an armory division, and so on.1She does think that there is an exception, which we will consider below,
where a person causally contributes a small portion of a larger threat. In
that case, she thinks that the person’s liability depends on the size of the
whole threat, not the size of the part that the person contributes. So she
would now qualify, but not reject, the first sentence in the quote above.2
McMahan argues that in practice the responsibility of civilians for
unjust threats is typically too trivial to make them liable to be killed. He
writes,Most civilians have, on their own, no capacity at all to affect the ac-
tion of their government. They may pay their taxes, vote or even
campaign for particular political candidates (sometimes on the basis
of general sympathy with their overall positions on matters of policy
but seldom because of their advocacy of war), participate in the cul-
ture from which the country’s political leaders have emerged, fail to
protest their country’s unjust war, perhaps because they correctly be-. Cécile Fabre, “Guns, Food, and Liability to Attack in War,” Ethics 120 (2009): 36–63,
e also Cécile Fabre, Cosmopolitan War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 76–77,
osmopolitan Peace (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 6.
. Fabre, Cosmopolitan War, 76–77.
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All use lieve that to do so would be ineffective, or perhaps because they ap-
prove of the war, and so on; but none of these things, nor even all of
them together, is ordinarily sufficient for the forfeiture of a person’s
right not to be attacked and killed. Military attack exceeds what a
person may ordinarily be liable to on the basis of these comparatively
trivial sources of responsibility.3McMahan does not make the idea that these sources of responsibility are
comparatively trivial completely transparent. He might seem to refer to
themental states of the civilians—their intentions, knowledge, or beliefs.
But this reading is not best. He notes that some of these people intend
their contributions, and others knowingly contribute. Furthermore, he
thinks that even those who are minimally responsible for causing or pos-
ing lethal threats to others are liable to be killed to avert these threats.4
A better reading is that McMahan believes that the causal contributions
that these civilians make to lethal unjust threats are too small to make
them liable to be killed.5 Later, McMahan relies on the same idea as part
of a package of considerations that make it wrong to attack civilians in a
wide range of circumstances in practice.6
Neither Fabre nor McMahan provides a clear account of how causa-
tion is scalar, or why this matters to liability. Fabre, for example, simply sug-
gests that certain functions, such as tightening the screws on tanks, make a
smaller causal contribution to a threat than others, such as driving a truck-
load of munitions. And legal scholars also take this approach.7 McMahan
rejects the significance of proximity.8 His first sentence in the above quote
might suggest that he believes that if X cannot on his own affect whether
Y poses a threat, any causal contribution that X makes to the threat that
Y poses is too small for X to be liable to be killed. But he does not explain
why.
Seth Lazar thinks that liability to be killed can be grounded in either
high culpability with minimal causal contribution or minimal culpability
with great causal contribution. He briefly suggests a set of conditions that. Jeff McMahan, Killing in War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 225.
. See Jeff McMahan, “The Basis of Moral Liability to Defensive Killing,” Philosophical
15 (2005): 386–405.
. For confirmation that this is the right reading, see Jeff McMahan, “Who Is Liable to
lled in War,” Analysis 71 (2011): 544–59, 548–50. McMahan acknowledges that he
ot have a clear account of causation in “Basis of Moral Liability,” 396.
. See McMahan, Killing in War, 231.
. The use of such examples is common. See, e.g., Michael N. Schmitt, “Humanitar-
w and Direct Participation in Hostilities by Private Contractors or Civilian Employ-
expert paper submitted to the International Committee of the Red Cross, October
14–24); Yoram Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed
ct (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 178–81.
. McMahan, “Basis of Moral Liability,” 396.
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Amust be fulfilled for the person to make a great causal contribution to a
threat: her act must be necessary, sufficient, and direct. But he does not
explain what this means or defend his view further.9 He does provide one
example: he thinks that munitions workers make an insufficiently large
causal contribution to be liable to be killed to avert lethal threats in
war unless they are culpable. He thinks that it is too difficult to tell whether
they are culpable to justify killing them.10
Helen Frowe criticizes the general view that those who make small
causal contributions are not liable to be killed by considering the follow-
ing example:9
1
1
ll use Mob : Mafia Boss wants to take Victim out, but he cannot afford to
hire Assassin, who is extremely skilled and thus extremely expen-
sive. Mafia Boss has a whip-round amongst all the members of his
mob, none of whom really like Victim. Everyone coughs up a few
pounds for the assassination fund.11Frowe believes that each contributor is liable to defensive harm even
though his causal contribution to the hit is small. But even if Frowe’s in-
tuition about liability is sound, it is not clear why she thinks each person’s
contribution is small. Overall, then, just war theorists have relied on dif-
ferent views about the magnitude of causal contribution without any
deep investigation of causation.
II. CONTEXT AND METHODOLOGY
Here are some clarifications and methodological suggestions. First, I
work on the controversial but widely accepted assumption that causation
more generally grounds liability. This is for the obvious reason that if cau-
sation does not ground liability, neither do causal contributions.
Second, we are only concerned with whether causal contributions af-
fect liability. There are related issues, such as whether the stringency of our
duties not to contribute to unjust threats depends on themagnitude of our
causal contribution to those threats. Although these issues are related,
their relationship may not be straightforward, and I do not explore it.
Third, there are different possible views of how causal contributions
relate to liability. A threshold view is that liability to be harmed to avert a
threat depends on some causal threshold being reached. A scalar view is
that the magnitude of harm that a person is liable to suffer to avert a le-
thal threat depends on the magnitude of that person’s causal contribu-
tion to the threat. A scalar view is more attractive. This is because on. Seth Lazar, Sparing Civilians (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 94–95.
0. Ibid., 95.
1. Helen Frowe, Defensive Killing (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 175.
This content downloaded from 035.176.047.006 on January 22, 2018 03:41:13 AM
subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Tadros Causal Contributions and Liability 407
Athe threshold view small differences in themagnitude of a person’s causal
contribution can make a very large difference to the magnitude of harm
that a person is liable to suffer to avert a threat near the threshold.
Fourth, as causation may be a complex idea with many dimensions,
there may be different kinds of causal contributions that a person can
make. Those with this view of causation may think that only some of
these contributions are relevant to liability, or that only some come in
degrees in a way that affects the magnitude of liability.
So the view that I will consider is the following:1
pletel
ians, 9
1
pabili
(Oxfo
causa
ll use Causal Contribution : The magnitude of harm that a person is liable
to suffer to avert a threat because of the causal contribution that she
makes to that threat is proportionate to the magnitude of the causal
contribution that she makes to the threat, or to some dimension or
dimensions of the causal contribution she makes to the threat.There are too many versions of this view to conduct an exhaustive study,
so I consider only those with the greatest initial plausibility.
Fifth, even if causation affects liability, it is only one among a range
of factors that determine liability. The other most important factor is re-
sponsible agency. At one extreme, there are those who are highly culpa-
ble for the threats they contribute to. At the other, there are those who
causally contribute to a threat but are not morally responsible at all. And
there are grades of responsibility between these extremes.
A simple view is thatCausal Contribution applies equally across the full
spectrum of cases. But some might think thatCausal Contribution and re-
sponsibility interact in a more complex way. One view is that high levels
of culpability swampdifferences that degrees of causal contributionwould
otherwise make to liability, but low levels of culpability do not.12
Although this is a possible view, it seems doubtful. Those who be-
lieve that causation grounds liability typically believe this even for those
who are highly culpable: they think that those who are highly culpable
for attempting to pose threats are liable to less harm than those who ac-
tually pose threats.13 Suppose that this is right, that causation is scalar,
and that Causal Contribution applies to those who are not very culpable.
In light of this, it is hard to believe that great culpability swamps the
significance of causal contributions. To see this, suppose that X makes a2. Thanks to a reviewer of Ethics for prompting me to consider this. It is not com-
y clear, but Seth Lazar might intend something like this view. See Lazar, Sparing Civil-
4.
3. See, e.g., McMahan, “Basis of Moral Liability,” 386; Victor Tadros, “Causation, Cul-
ty, and Liability,” in The Ethics of Self-Defense, ed. Christian Coons and Michael Weber
rd: Oxford University Press, 2016), 110–30. Lazar is also sympathetic to the view that
l contribution is necessary for liability to be killed. See Lazar, Sparing Civilians, 94.
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Aminiscule contribution to a lethal threat and Y makes no contribution to
that threat. The view under consideration implies that if X and Y are
minimally culpable, there is little difference in their liability. If they
are highly culpable, there is a large difference in their liability. This is
initially unattractive. Nevertheless, I will consider both cases of high cul-
pability and those where culpability is less.
I leave aside cases of moral responsibility without culpability and
causal contribution without responsibility. A person who is morally re-
sponsible for causing an unjust threat is a person who permissibly takes
a risk of posing an unjust threat, and that risk is realized. A person who
lacks responsibility for posing a threat either has no reason to believe
that she will or might pose a threat or is not in control of whether she
does so.
Some believe that some or all of these people are liable to be harmed
to avert threats they pose. As it is difficult to assess liability in these cases
independently of any questions about themagnitude of a person’s causal
contribution to a threat, we should not be confident in our assessment of
themagnitude of a person’s causal contributions to a threat in such cases
either. As many people who causally contribute to unjust lethal threats
posed in war are at least somewhat culpable for doing so, even this more
restricted study has wide-ranging implications. With this in mind, let us
turn to different versions of Causal Contribution.
III. PORTION OF THE THREAT
The idea that causal contributions come in degrees has not received a
great deal of attention in the philosophy of causation.14 Some might be
skeptical about this idea in general. One source of skepticism arises from
the still-popular counterfactual view of causation. Consider this simplistic
counterfactual view: one event, E1, causes another event, E2, if and only if
E2 counterfactually depends on E1. Obviously, this is a woeful theory of
causation—even if causation ought to be understood counterfactually,
counterfactual dependence is neither necessary nor sufficient for causa-
tion. But it plausibly explains simple cases.
As counterfactual dependence is not scalar, some might doubt the
idea that there are degrees of causal contribution. Either E2 counter-
factually depends on E1 or it does not. For example, on the simplistic14. For some exceptions, see David Lewis, “Causation as Influence,” Journal of Philos-
ophy 97 (2000): 182–97, 189–91; Matthew Braham and Martin van Hees, “Degrees of Cau-
sation,” Erkenntnis 71 (2009): 323–44; H. L. A. Hart and Tony Honoré, Causation in the Law,
2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), 233; andMichael S. Moore, Causation and
Responsibility: An Essay in Law, Morals, and Metaphysics (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2009). For critical discussion of Moore, see Helen Beebee, “Legal Responsibility and Scalar
Causation,” Jurisprudence 4 (2013): 102–8.
This content downloaded from 035.176.047.006 on January 22, 2018 03:41:13 AM
ll use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Tadros Causal Contributions and Liability 409
Aview, if a threat counterfactually depends on X’s act, X causes the threat;
if it does not, X does not.
Even on the simplistic view, though, causal contributions can vary. X
poses a threat if X will cause harm unless X is prevented from doing so.
The threat is the total harm that X will cause. Part of the threat might
counterfactually depend on X’s conduct. The degree of X’s causal con-
tribution might correspond to the size of the part that counterfactually
depends on X’s conduct.15 This general idea could then be adjusted in
light of more sophisticated counterfactual views. Portion of the Threat is
a version of Causal Contribution that claims that liability depends on the
magnitude of the portion of the threat that counterfactually depends on
one’s act (or some more sophisticated proposal of the relevant counter-
factuals).
This case illustrates the view:1
in Ste
versity
1
“Prop
ll use Flamethrower : Y ’s flamethrower is running low on fuel and X tops it
up. Y is about to fire at V, threatening to cause V third-degree burns.
Had X not acted, all else would have been equal, but Y would have
threatened to cause V second-degree burns.Portion of the Threat implies that X’s contribution is the difference be-
tween second-degree burns and third-degree burns and his liability de-
pends on that amount. He is thus liable to suffer less harm to avert
the threat posed by Y than he would have been had he completely refu-
eled Y’s empty flamethrower.
The general view that the magnitude of a person’s liability to pre-
ventive harm depends on the magnitude of harm that the person threat-
ens to cause is highly plausible. In light of this, some might find it obvi-
ous that Portion of the Threat is true. But some argue that if many people
each make a very small contribution to a very large threat, the liability of
each depends on the magnitude of the whole threat, rather than the part
that counterfactually depends on their conduct. Fabre, for one, believes
roughly this.16 The issue is too difficult to resolve here, but there is at
least some doubt that Portion of the Threat is true.
Even if Portion of the Threat is true, a person can become liable to be
killed by making a small contribution to a large threat: the threat can be
tomany lives, and so the portion of the threat that the person contributes
may be a matter of life and death to one or more people.5. This sense in which there can be degrees of causal contribution is acknowledged
phen Mumford and Rani Lill Anjum, Getting Causes from Powers (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
Press, 2011), 21.
6. See Fabre, Cosmopolitan War, 76–77. For further discussion, see Jeff McMahan,
ortionality in Defense against Inflictors of Small Harms” (unpublished manuscript).
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AIV. PORTION OF THE CAUSE
On some views of causal contribution, a threat, T, may counterfactually
depend on each of two earlier events, E1 and E2, and yet E1 may make a
greater causal contribution to T than E2. One idea is that the causal con-
tribution that one makes to a threat depends on the magnitude of the
contribution that one makes to the cause of the threat. One version of
this idea is that the magnitude of one’s causal contribution corresponds
to the magnitude of the portion of the cause that one contributes.
Consider the following:1
ll use Blood Loss : X and Y independently cut V, causing him to lose blood.
V dies of blood loss. V would not have died had he not been cut by
both X and Y. Y’s cut causes V to lose muchmore blood than X’s cut.The whole threat counterfactually depends on both X’s act and Y ’s act.
But Y seems to make a greater causal contribution to the death than X.17
One plausible explanation is that the death is caused by something
quantifiable—the loss of sufficient blood—and Y contributes a greater
portion of the cause than X. Portion of the Cause is the related version
of Causal Contribution that claims that liability depends on the size of
the portion of the cause that one contributes. This theory only applies
when the cause of harm can be divided into portions and there is a prin-
cipled way of determining the size of these portions.
Somemight find it intuitive that Y is liable to suffer more harm than
X to avert the threat they both cause. This view might be supported by
the intuition that if V’s death could be prevented by killing either X
or Y, Y should be killed. Portion of the Cause provides one explanation
of any such intuition.
I have at most, though, a weak intuition that Y should be killed. Fur-
thermore, Portion of the Cause is not the only possible explanation of the
intuition. Here is an alternative. Had Y not acted, X would have caused V
less harm than Y would have caused V had X not acted. This fact might
be relevant to liability. We can remove this distraction by considering a
case where no harm would have been caused by either X or Y had they
acted alone, but together their acts contribute to the cause of a great
deal of harm:Boulder : X and Y together push a boulder off a cliff that crushes V.
Neither would have been able to get the boulder off the cliff with-
out the other pushing. X is much stronger than Y and exerts much
more force on the boulder.7. See Moore, Causation and Responsibility, 275–76.
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AThe force that X and Y together provide causes the boulder to roll off the
cliff, killing V. The existence of this magnitude of force counterfactually
depends on both X pushing and Y pushing. But X provides a larger por-
tion of the cause than Y. There seems to be no difference in the liability
of X and Y, and this seems true whether X and Y are highly culpable or
they are merely negligent. Thus, I doubt that Portion of the Cause is right.
V. PERSONAL CAUSATION
In some cases, causal contributions seem to depend on the relationship
between a person and an effect. When I causally contribute to an effect,
the relevant causal relationship is between the effect and me. This rela-
tionship can vary in strength, it might be argued, and a person’s causal
contribution depends on it.
To see that this is plausible, consider a case not involvingwrongdoing:ll use Performance : Y puts on a moving musical performance which X re-
cords. Later, the recording is played to an audience, whose mem-
bers are moved.The audience being moved counterfactually depends on both X making
the recording and Y performing, and both causally contribute to the au-
dience being moved. But Y seems to make a larger causal contribution
than X. This is true even if X and Y each intend the audience to be
moved. But there is nothing quantifiable that Y provides more of than X.
One explanation is that the objective probability of Y’s act resulting
in the audience being moved is greater than X’s. But even if we canmake
sense of objective probabilities, this is not true if X is uncertain to record
the performance but Y is certain to perform. A second explanation is
that X is easily replaceable whereas Y is not. But the intuition holds even
if there are many musicians to replace Y and hardly any sound engineers
to replace X.
Personal causation provides a more immediate and appealing ex-
planation. It exists in cases where there is the right kind of relationship
between properties central to personhood and the effect. Properties
such as agency are central to personhood, and that explains why we are
powerfully inclined to say that a person caused a result where the person’s
agency was involved in the right way. This is in contrast to cases where my
body is involved in bringing about an effect but I am not, such as cases of
involuntary muscle spasm. In such cases, my body causes the effect, but I
do not.
The line between me doing something and my body doing it is not
sharp; what I do while sleepwalking, for example, is a borderline case.
That explains why we are less inclined to say that a person caused anThis content downloaded from 035.176.047.006 on January 22, 2018 03:41:13 AM
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Aevent where the person was sleepwalking. Furthermore, consciousness
and agential involvement come in degrees, and the extent of a person’s
causal contribution to an effect may depend on these degrees.
Where two people contribute to an event, the magnitude of each
person’s causal contribution may depend on the depth of the different
relationships between features central to personhood and the event. In
Performance the relationship between features central to Y’s personhood
and the audience being moved is plausibly deeper than the relationship
between features central to X’s personhood and the audience being
moved. This explains why we are inclined to see Y as making a greater
causal contribution to the audience being moved than X.
Different versions of this idea focus on different properties of per-
sonhood. And different versions focus on different claims about the
causal relationships between properties of personhood and the effect.
Furthermore, some versions claim that the same properties are relevant
in all cases, whereas others claim that this is a contextual matter that de-
pends, for example, on the nature of the activity we are concerned with.
Here I rely only on the rough idea.
Now consider the following:ll use Torture : X fixes the door to a torture room. Y tortures V in the
room. Z stands by and cheers Y on. Had any of X, Y, or Z not done
what they did, V would not have been tortured.Y’s causal contribution to V’s suffering seems greater than X’s or Z’s,
even though V’s suffering counterfactually depends on all of these acts.
The deeper connection between the torture and features of Y’s person-
hood is one explanation.
Personhood is a version of Causal Contribution that claims that a per-
son’s liability depends on the magnitude of her personal causal contri-
bution. To see that this view is attractive, suppose that harming X, Y,
or Z could save V and that all three intend the torture. Y, it seems, should
be harmed, other things being equal. The fact that Y’s agency is more
deeply engaged in bringing about the torture attractively explains this
result.
Even with only a rough characterization of Personhood in hand, we
can also see that it might help to explain some intuitions in war, for ex-
ample, why those who fire their weapons seem liable to a greater degree
of harm than those who load them. Firing does seem more deeply con-
nected to features of the agency of the person who fires than to those of
the person who loads.
The main contribution that Personhood promises to make to the
morality of war, though, is to deepen the familiar idea that liability is
grounded in moral responsibility. Furthermore, even if Personhood isThis content downloaded from 035.176.047.006 on January 22, 2018 03:41:13 AM
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Aright, it provides little support to noncombatant immunity. As defenders
of Causal Contribution are well aware, responsibility-relevant facts do not
powerfully distinguish combatants and noncombatants. Lethal threats
may be just as deeply attributable features central to the personhood
of noncombatants as to the personhood of combatants. Noncombatants
may exercise special skill in performing their roles, for example, in the
manufacture of precision weapons, in training combatants, and so on.
And they, like combatants, often intend to contribute to the war effort.
Furthermore, many combatants are relatively unskilled, and the
threats they pose are not deeply connected to central features of person-
hood, but this does not seem to undermine their liability to be killed. A
poorly trained and terrified combatant who starts to fire an automatic
weapon into a crowd without thinking about it is surely liable to be killed
to avert the threat he poses. Still, Personhood may well be both true and
important, and it is a version of Causal Contribution.
VI. CAUSING AND ENABLING
Enabling is a version of Causal Contribution that claims that those who en-
able threats are liable to less harm than those who directly cause them.18
The distinction between enabling and causing is intuitive but hard to ex-
plicate. Consider the following:1
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Mack
ll use Match: A damp match is dried and then struck.The striking seems to cause the match to be lit, whereas the drying only
enables this.19 But why?8. Adil Ahmad Haque relies on the distinction between enabling and causing to help
rt a more stringent duty not to kill noncombatants; see Adil Ahmad Haque, Law and
ity at War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 73–77. There is a large literature on
er enabling harm is easier to justify than causing harm. See, e.g., Jeff McMahan, “Kill-
etting Die, and Withdrawing Aid,” Ethics 103 (1993): 250–79; Kadri Vihvelin and
ce Tomkow, “The Dif,” Journal of Philosophy 102 (2005): 183–205; Samuel C. Rickless,
Moral Status of Enabling Harm,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (2011): 66–86; Chris-
arry and GerhardØverland, “The Feasible Alternatives Thesis: Kicking Away the Live-
s of the Global Poor,” Politics, Philosophy and Economics 11 (2012): 97–119; Fiona
ard, Doing and Allowing Harm (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), chap. 4; Jason
a, “Enabling Harm, Doing Harm, and Undoing One’s Own Behavior,” Ethics 126
): 68–90. My own sympathies are with the view that enabling harm is no easier to justify
ausing it and that the cases where this seems false are mainly those that involve with-
ng resources that one is entitled to.
9. See Lawrence Brian Lombard, “Causes, Enablers, and the Counterfactual Analy-
hilosophical Studies 59 (1990): 195–211, 201–2. For doubts, see Penelope Mackie,
ing, Enabling, and Counterfactual Dependence,” Philosophical Studies 62 (1991):
0. For a reply, see Lawrence Brian Lombard, “Causes and Enablers: A Reply to
ie,” Philosophical Studies 65 (1992): 319–22.
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AThe contrast is not simply one of proximity. Events in a long chain
may directly cause each other. The first event, in this case, is a direct
cause of the last, as is true of a long chain of dominoes, each of which
topples the next. A better view is that enablers are distinct from prior
causes in that they provide background conditions that make possible
the relationship between a cause and its outcome.20 But it is difficult
to explain what makes something a mere background condition, and
the difficulty of doing this may suggest that there is no real metaphys-
ical distinction between causing and enabling, but rather a difference
in the conversational felicity of pointing out that something is a cause
when this does not illuminate the case under consideration.21
Without an analysis of the distinction in hand, let us explore whether
the intuitive distinction between causing and enabling significantly af-
fects liability. I doubt that it does. First, culpably enabling a lethal threat
is sometimes sufficient for liability to be killed. Consider the following:2
Conte
Huw
2
in thi
Journa
ll use Burn: X and Y hate V. Y captures V and ties him to a tree to burn
him to death, but he can’t get his wet match lit. X has a battery-
powered hair dryer with him and begins drying the match, which
Y will then strike to burn V to death. D can prevent V from being
burned to death only by killing X.X seems liable to be killed to prevent V’s death even though X only en-
ables Y to kill him.
Perhaps it might be argued that even if X is liable to be killed, his
liability is less than Y’s. This view might be supported by noting that if
D could prevent V from being killed by killing either X or Y, he ought
to kill Y. This view is intuitive, but I doubt that it is best explained by
the distinction between enabling and direct causes.
Who ought to be killed does not seem powerfully to depend on who
dries and who strikes the match, but rather on other features of the case,
such as the fact that the killing is mainly Y’s plan and that his personal
involvement is greater. If we hold all other things equal but make Y
dry the match and X strike it, it still seems that D ought to kill Y, even
though X does not now merely enable the killing.
Perhaps it might be argued that the contrast between causing and
enabling is more important where those involved are less culpable.
But this is doubtful. Consider the following:0. See, e.g., Hart and Honoré, Causation in the Law; and Peter Menzies, “Causation in
xt,” in Causation, Physics, and the Constitution of Reality: Russell’s Republic Revisited, ed.
Price and Richard Corry (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 191–223.
1. For the general difficulty of distinguishing metaphysical and linguistic questions
s context, see Eric Swanson, “Lessons from the Context Sensitivity of Causal Talk,”
l of Philosophy 107 (2010): 221–42.
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All use Burned Car : V has been knocked unconscious by a kidnapper and is
locked in the trunk of an old car. X and Y are about to set fire to the
car for fun, not realizing that V is inside. However, they are both
negligent about V’s presence. If they set fire to the car, V will be
killed. They agree that Y will pour petrol over the car. X will light
the match. Z can prevent them from setting fire to the car only
by shooting either X or Y in the leg.Z seems to have no more reason to shoot X than Y, even though Y seems
to enable the threat whereas X causes it. Overall, the contrast between
enabling and directly causing does not seem morally significant, even
if there is a robust way of distinguishing these things.
VII. LEWIS-STYLE INFLUENCE
Another view is that the causal contribution that one event makes to an-
other depends on how sensitive the second event is to the first. David
Lewis developed a counterfactual account of this idea. He argued that
E1 causes O only if there is a substantial range of alterations on E1 that
would alter O, and the degree of the causal contribution that E1 makes
to O depends on that range.22 This proposal provides a plausible alterna-
tive explanation for why Y ’s conduct seems a more important cause of
the audience being moved in Performance than X’s conduct. A range of
alterations in Y ’s performance gives rise to a range of alterations in the
audience’s reaction. This is not true to the same degree of X’s recording.
Lewis-Style Influence is the version of Causal Contribution that relies on this
idea.
Before considering Lewis-Style Influence, I respond to an objection to
Lewis’s general view. As we will see, although this objection is forceful, it
is not a decisive objection to Lewis-Style Influence. Lewis developed his ac-
count of causation to deal with the problem of preemption. Consider his
case:Rock: Suzy throws a rock, which hits a bottle, and the bottle smashes.
Billy throws a rock, which arrives immediately afterward and flies
through the space where the bottle was.Had Suzy not thrown her rock, the bottle would nevertheless have been
smashed, but the same thing is true of Billy’s throw. The simplistic coun-
terfactual view of causation described in Section III has no way to distin-
guish Suzy’s throw from Billy’s, but it is clear that Suzy’s throw, not Billy’s,
causes the bottle to smash.2. Lewis, “Causation as Influence,” 191.
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ALewis proposed that the causal difference between them is explained
by the fact that small adjustments in Suzy’s throw, but not Billy’s, affect the
smashing, and thismakes Suzy’s throwhavemuchmore causal power than
Billy’s. He writes,2
2
ence,
ll use Even if the throws are so much alike that removing Suzy’s throw al-
together would make little difference to the shattering, it is still true
that altering Suzy’s throw slightly while holding Billy’s fixed would
make a lot of difference to the shattering, but altering Billy’s throw
slightly while holding Suzy’s fixed would not. Take an alteration in
which Suzy’s rock is heavier, or she throws a little sooner, or she aims
at the neck of the bottle instead of the side. The shattering changes
correspondingly.Make just the same alterations to Billy’s preempted
throw, and the shattering is (near enough) unchanged.23This response to the problem of preemption fails. To see why, note that
these two things are consistent: (1) Suzy’s rock actually hits the bottle,
smashing it; and (2) in many nearby possible worlds where Suzy’s throw
is held constant but Billy’s throw is altered, the time and manner of the
smashing are altered. These things are true if small alterations in Billy’s
throw would result in his rock hitting the bottle rather than Suzy’s.
Where this is true, Lewis’s theory implausibly implies that the causal po-
tency of Billy’s throw is increased.
First notice that if Suzy’s throw occurs just before Billy’s, small alter-
ations in Billy’s throw alter the time and manner of the smashing—those
alterations that make Billy’s throw occur before Suzy’s. But the causal po-
tency of Billy’s throw is not greater in cases where it occurs just after
Suzy’s. If his rock does not hit, it is completely causally impotent. Fur-
thermore, suppose that there is a powerful constant wind that would
have been behind Billy’s throw but for a van that drove behind Billy, very
briefly interrupting the wind. In worlds where the wind is behind his
throw, Billy’s rock arrives first. In this variation, hold Suzy’s throw fixed
but make Billy’s occur slightly later. The time and manner of the smash-
ing alter, but again, this fact does not increase the causal potency of his
actual throw.24
One response is to supplement a counterfactual account of causa-
tion with an account of complete and incomplete causal chains. Billy’s
throw makes no causal contribution, on this view, because there is no
complete causal chain between his throw and the smashing. This is con-
sistent with the idea that the magnitude of the causal contribution that3. Ibid.
4. For related objections to Lewis’s view, see Jonathan Schaffer, “Causation, Influ-
and Effluence,” Analysis 61 (2001): 11–19.
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Aone event makes to another depends in part on the pattern of counter-
factual dependence that Lewis relies on.
To see this, suppose that E1 and E2 are each part of a complete
causal chain resulting in O. Small alterations in E1 lead to small altera-
tions in O, whereas small alterations in E2 lead to no alterations in O.
Lewis’s view, as amended, implies that E2 has less causal influence than
E1. This nicely explains our causal judgments inPerformance andTorture.
The related version of Causal Contribution—Lewis-Style Influence—is
that these differences in causal contribution make a difference to liabil-
ity. This may help to explain our intuitions in some cases. Consider
Fabre’s view that tightening the screws on a tankmakes too small a causal
contribution to the threat posed by the tank driver to make that person
liable to be harmed. Small differences in the manner and time of the
screw tightening make no difference to the manner and time of the
deaths caused by combatants. In contrast, small differences in the man-
ner and time of shooting make a large difference to the manner and
time of death. This, it might be argued, explains why those who tighten
screws are not liable to be killed whereas those who fire weapons are.
To evaluate this view, we must hold other factors that might influ-
ence liability constant. These include other facts that might influence
the degree of a person’s causal contribution, such as overdetermination,
preemption, and remoteness, as well as independent factors that affect
liability, such as culpability.
With this in mind, consider the following:252
fluenc
death
ll use Button and Lever : X has a button in front of him, and Y has a lever in
front of him. If both X presses his button and Y pulls his lever before
a certain time, t, V will be killed. How and when X presses his button
make no difference to how and when V will be killed if Y pulls his
lever. How and when Y pulls his lever makes a significant difference
to how and when V will be killed if X presses his button. X will press
his button and Y will pull his lever, with the joint intention of killing
V, if nothing is done. D can prevent this from occurring by killing
either X or Y.V’s death counterfactually depends on both X’s act and Y’s act. However,
X’s act has less Lewis-style influence over the death than Y’s. The man-
ner and time of V’s death are less sensitive to small alterations in X’s act
than small alterations in Y’s. Somemight think that this case casts further
doubt on Lewis’s view because it seems that X and Y will make an equal
contribution to V’s death if nothing is done.5. This is a variation of a case offered by Schaffer in “Causation, Influence, and Ef-
e.” In Schaffer’s case, Y does nothing and X’s act is sufficient to bring about the
.
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ABut suppose that Y makes a greater causal contribution to the death
than X if both act. Lewis-Style Influence implies that X is liable to suffer
less harm than Y to avert the threat to V. Some might defend this view
because it matters not only whether we live or die but also how and when
we live or die. X is not in control of how V lives or dies, whereas Y is. But
this difference cannot support Lewis-Style Influence. Suppose that of all of
the times and modes of death that Y could bring about by pulling his le-
ver, he brings about the one that is best for V. Lewis-Style Influence never-
theless implies that Y is liable to suffer greater harm than X because of
worse alternatives that were available to him that he did not take. This
is hard to believe.
Y may be liable to suffer greater harm if he causes V to die in a worse
way than he could. But this is not best explained by Lewis-Style Influence,
but rather by Y’s increased culpability. If we eliminate this factor, for ex-
ample, by making Y aware that pulling the lever will result in V’s death,
but making him nonculpably ignorant of the possibilities available to
him, there seems to be no difference in their liabilities.
The same result is intuitive in cases of reduced culpability. Suppose
that X and Y think that V is liable to be killed but negligently form this
belief. Or suppose that X and Y are negligent about whether they will
cause the death by pressing and pulling. It still does not seem very plau-
sible that Y is liable to suffer greater harm than X. Overall, Lewis’s view of
the way in which causation is scalar is at best controversial, and even if it
is right, it has no bearing on liability.
VIII. OVERDETERMINATION, PREEMPTION, AND CAUSAL
CONTRIBUTION
A person can causally contribute to a threat without the threat, or any
portion of it, counterfactually depending on her act. This is so where the
whole threat is overdetermined. It has been argued that thedegreeof causal
contribution that one event makes to another depends on whether the re-
sult is overdetermined, and to what degree.26
McMahan seems to rely on something like this as an explanation for
why voters are not typically liable to be killed if they vote for a govern-
ment that starts an unjust war.27 His explanation is not quite this. He sug-
gests that it is the lack of capacity to influence their government that
makes them nonliable. As voters together cause the election of the gov-
ernment that starts the war, these voters do play a causal role in the un-
just war.28 What McMahan probably means is that the actions of the gov-26. See Braham and van Hees, “Degrees of Causation.”
27. McMahan, Killing in War, 225; Fabre, Cosmopolitan War, 77.
28. See also McMahan, Killing in War, 217–18.
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Aernment do not counterfactually depend on the acts or omissions of any
individual voter.
A. Overdetermination
Let us focus on the simplest overdetermination case first: E1 and E2 are
each sufficient without the other, in conjunction with all events other
than E1 and E2 that occur, to bring about an outcome, O. But if neither
E1 nor E2 had occurred, O would not have occurred.
Here are two kinds of overdetermination case. In preemption cases,
E1 causes O. E2 makes no causal contribution to O, but it would have
caused O had E1 not occurred. For example, two tigers are chasing an
antelope. The first tiger kills it. Had it not done so, the second tiger
would have killed it. It would have survived had neither tiger been pres-
ent. But only the first tiger causes its death, preempting the act of the
second tiger.
In cases of simultaneous overdetermination, E1 and E2 each caus-
ally contribute to O. For example, two people push a boulder over a cliff,
and each pushes sufficiently hard that they would have pushed the boul-
der off the cliff alone.29 There is a question about whether E1 causes O in
this case.30 Let us leave this more or less semantic debate aside—E1
makes a contribution to the cause ofO, so let us say that E1makes a causal
contribution to O.
Here is how overdetermination can come in degrees. Suppose that
a set of events, {E}, causally contribute to O. Some subset of {E} would
have been sufficient to cause O without all other members of {E}, given
all other facts and events that occur. The larger the remainder, the more
heavily overdetermined O is. For example, suppose that a group of n
people together push a boulder off a cliff. Each exerts equal force, and
n – r people each pushing this hard would have been sufficient to get
the boulder off the cliff. The largerr is, themore heavily overdetermined
it is that the boulder is pushed off the cliff.
Now consider this simplified voting case:2
cases
over t
acted
essary
other
3
ll use Vote : There is a referendum on whether to prosecute an unjust war.
A bare majority will result in war; anything short of a bare majority
will not. There are 100 voters. X votes for war. No one abstains. X
can have no other influence on whether the war occurs.9. Carolina Sartorio pointed out to me that there is a further distinction between
where each person in fact contributes part of the force necessary to get the boulder
he cliff but would have contributed the whole amount necessary had the other not
, on the one hand, and cases where each person contributes the whole amount nec-
, but more force than is necessary to get the boulder off the cliff is applied, on the
hand. I doubt that this distinction is morally important, so I leave it aside.
0. See Lewis, “Causation as Influence,” 182.
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AIf there are 51 votes for war, the war counterfactually depends on how X
casts his vote.
Now compare two further variations. In Vote 2, 52 vote for war. In
Vote 3, all 100 vote for war. The war counterfactually depends on X’s vote
in neitherVote 2 nor Vote 3. But it might be argued that X’s causal contri-
bution to the war is greater inVote 2 than inVote 3 because the war is more
heavily overdetermined in Vote 3 than in Vote 2. One explanation is that
more changes to the actual scenario would need to be made in order
for X’s vote to make a difference to whether the war occurs inVote 3 than
Vote 2. Another is that the war counterfactually depends on X’s vote in a
wider range of nearby possible worlds inVote 2 than inVote 3.31 Overdeter-
mination is a version of Causal Contribution that claims that liability de-
pends on the magnitude of overdetermination.
B. Overdetermination, Permissibility, and Liability
Here is one simple way in which overdetermination affects liability. Sup-
pose that a person is certain to die whether or not one causally contrib-
utes to the death. This makes it easier to justify causally contributing to
the death: given that one can do nothing to save the person’s life, one is
sometimes permitted to causally contribute to the death where doing so
will achieve something valuable. And if one is justified in contributing to
the death, one’s liability is either reduced or negated.
It is not news that justifications affect liability. But inflicting harm
can be justified because the harm is overdetermined, and this is one way
in which a causal fact affects liability. To see this, consider the following:3
ficien
cause
would
tempt
event
Hees,
degre
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ll use Contribution to Save : X is certain to kill V whether or not Y contrib-
utes to the death. If Y contributes, he will save the life of another
innocent person, Z. Y does this.It would have been wrong for Y to act in a way that makes a difference to
whether V lives or dies to save Z. But it seems permissible for Y to contrib-
ute to the death where doing so makes no difference to whether V lives
or dies. Or, at least, this is true if Y acts only in order to save Z’s life.321. In more complex cases, many combinations of the events that occur would be suf-
t to bring about the outcome. For example, suppose that E1, E2, E3, and E4 together
E5. Now suppose that the following combinations, and only these, among the group,
have been sufficient to bring about E5: (E1, E2), (E1, E3), (E1, E4), (E2, E4). It is
ing to claim that E1 makes a greater causal contribution to E5 than any of the other
s in virtue of the fact that E1 is a member of more sufficient sets. See Braham and van
“Degrees of Causation.” If what I say below about the simple case is right—that the
e of overdetermination is irrelevant to liability—we can set aside this more complex
2. I argue that this is one kind of case where intentions make a difference to permis-
y in Victor Tadros, The Ends of Harm: The Moral Foundations of Criminal Law (Oxford:
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AIf Y acts in order to save Z’s life, Y is also liable to suffer much less
harm to save V than X. So in this way, overdetermination makes a differ-
ence to liability. This, though, does not support Overdetermination. Over-
determination is the view that liability depends on the degree of a person’s
causal contribution to a threat, whereas the argument just presented is
one that suggests that a person’s liability sometimes depends on whether
the threat counterfactuallydependson theperson’s contribution.As I sug-
gested earlier, simple counterfactual dependence does not come in de-
grees: either the person’s conduct will make the relevant difference or not.
Contribution to Save would support Overdetermination if Y ’s liability
depends on the degree to which V’s death is overdetermined. Suppose
that we introduce other people who would take X’s place were X not pres-
ent. I doubt that this would make a difference to Y’s liability as such. In-
sofar as it seems to make a difference, this is best explained by the fact
that we aremore confident in concluding that V’s death is certain to occur
in cases where his death is more heavily overdetermined. If we make the
relevant probabilities explicit, hold them constant, and vary the degree of
overdetermination, I doubt that there is any difference in Y’s liability.
C. Culpable Overdetermination
Still, the argument just offered might seem to support the view that vot-
ers are not liable to be harmed because they do not, and cannot, make a
difference to whether anyone lives or dies. But we should not draw that
conclusion too quickly. The argument just offered is that overdetermi-
nation affects the justification of making a causal contribution to a threat
and that justification can affect liability. This does not show that over-
determination is relevant where making a contribution to a threat is un-
justifiable, or where a justification could be offered, but the person is not
motivated by the facts that make this true.
In order to make an assessment of these facts, we must hold other
things equal, including culpability, the gravity of the threat, and the num-
ber of people who must be killed to avert the threat. The last consider-
ation is especially important: where a threat is overdetermined by two
acts, both acts must be prevented to avert the threat, and this may involve
harming two people. Harming two people, even if they are culpable, is
harder to justify than harming one.Oxford University Press, 2011), chap. 7. For related discussion in the context of war, see Kai
Draper, War and Individual Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 91, 200–202.
Adil Haque thinks that those who permissibly threaten others because the harm they
threaten is overdetermined are liable to be killed to avert the threats they pose, though
I am not sure whether he would hold this view in cases such as those outlined here. See
Haque, Law and Morality at War, 72–73.
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AHere are two cases that do a decent job of holding these things
equal:ll use Fire : X and Y are each about to start a fire that, if nothing is done,
will kill V. The firewould not reachVwithout both fires being started.
D can either kill both X and Y, averting the threat, or kill no one, re-
sulting in V’s death.
Fire 2: X and Y are each about to start a fire that, if nothing is done,
will kill V. The fires will merge. Either X’s fire or Y’s fire would have
been sufficient without the other fire, in conjunction with the re-
maining facts, to give rise to an identical threat to V. D can either
kill both X and Y, averting the threat, or kill no one, resulting in
V’s death.To simplify our discussion, focus only on X. X’s act causally contributes
to the threat to V in both cases. However, in Fire, the threat that the fire
poses to V counterfactually depends on X’s act, whereas in Fire 2 it does
not. Is there a difference in X’s liability in these cases?
To assess the significance of a person’s causal contribution by com-
paring cases, we need to hold their mental state constant. But if a person
knows that the result is overdetermined, she also knows that she does not
raise the probability of the outcome, and that may affect culpability. To
neutralize this fact, suppose that X and Y have the same evidence and the
same beliefs in both cases: they act in order to raise the probability of the
outcome with the intention of killing V. When we consider this pair of
cases in this way, there seems to be no difference in the liability of X and
Y in Fire and Fire 2. Furthermore, X is clearly liable to be killed to avert
the threat that he will otherwise pose to V in both cases.
If this is right, it is wrong to think that a person cannot be liable to
be killed to avert a threat if that person did not, and cannot, make a dif-
ference to whether a threat occurs. In Fire 2, X cannot make such a dif-
ference. The same is true of Y. But they are both clearly liable to be killed
to avert the threat they together cause.
Perhaps it might be argued that overdetermination does make a dif-
ference where there are many contributors, as there are in Vote 3. But this
does not seem to make a difference, at least if we explicitly hold all else
constant. If we introduce many other fire starters into Fire 2 whom X
does not know about, and if we are explicit that the probabilities of V
dying are identical across different cases, I doubt that his liability to be
harmed alters (though, of course, it may be more difficult to justify kill-
ing anyone, as killingmore people would be required to avert the threat).
The same thing seems true in cases where the person’s conduct is
justifiable but was not justified. Conduct is justifiable but not justifiedThis content downloaded from 035.176.047.006 on January 22, 2018 03:41:13 AM
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Awhere the person had sufficient reason to act but did not act for that rea-
son. For example, if I kill a person simply out of hate, but that person was
in fact wrongly attacking me, my act was justifiable but not justified.
Suppose that in Fire 2 Y starting the fire saves a further innocent
person, but Y acts not in order to save this person, but only in order
to kill V. Starting the fire is justifiable because Y starting the fire makes
no difference to whether V lives or dies, but doing so saves a life. It is
not justified because Y is not motivated by this fact. I doubt that those
who act in a justifiable but unjustified way escape liability, or even have
diminished liability, when compared with those whose acts are neither
justifiable nor justified. Y’s liability seems to depend on the reasons for
which he acts, not on the reasons that were available to him to act.
To confirm this conclusion, consider this case I prepared in an ear-
lier work:3
ll use Poisoned Pipe.33 Boss offers a reward of £1000 to anyone who kills
Victim. Two henchmen, X and Y, independently find different points
in the water pipe leading to V’s home. X puts sufficient poison in
the pipe to kill V. At the same time, Y puts sufficient poison in the
pipe to kill V. The poisons mix. Each sees what the other is doing.
Neither can influence the behavior of the other. X’s poison alone
or Y’s poison alone would have caused V to suffer a very slow and
painful death. Together, their poison kills V swiftly and painlessly.
When X and Y both act, V’s death occurs at exactly the same time
as it would have occurred had either X or Y acted alone. X and Y
each acts only for the money.In previous work, I argued that X and Y each act wrongly, even though X
would have acted permissibly were she to have put poison in the pipe in
order to make V’s death less painful, and the same is true of Y. X and Y
also seem liable to suffer a great deal of harm to save V’s life. V seems
clearly permitted to kill X and Y in order to save his life. This seems true
even though X and Y each make V better off. The view that a person is
not liable to be killed if they make no difference to whether a person
lives or dies thus seems unsound; it even seems unsound where the act
that makes no difference is justifiable.
The same thing seems true in cases of less culpability. There seems
to be no difference in the liability of X and Y in the fire cases if they are
merely negligent, for example. Overall, although overdetermination can
affect liability by affecting whether a harm-causing act is justified, it does
not seem to play a further role in grounding liability.3. This is slightly modified from the version presented in Tadros, Ends of Harm, 159.
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AIX. PROBABILISTIC CAUSATION
One view that naturally implies that causal contribution is scalar is a
probabilistic view of causation, for probability is clearly scalar.34 Probabi-
listic causation is commonly defended as a theory of event-type causation
(e.g., smoking causes cancer) rather than a theory of event-token causa-
tion (this act of smoking caused this person to get cancer).35 Event-type
theories do not plausibly have implications for liability—Causal Contribu-
tion is a view about the causal contribution that a person actually made to
a threat, not about the causal power of the type of act that she performed.
Some have offered event-token probabilistic causal theories.36 Such
theories are hard to defend, given that some token causes decrease the
probability of their effects and some events increase the probability of
events they don’t cause. For example, if I shoot at you and miss but an-
other person shoots and hits, my shooting increased the probability of
your death but made no causal contribution to your death. Conversely,
suppose that I, a bad shot, shoot you dead. Had I not shot, a trained
marksman would have shot at you, but my shooting ensures that he does
not shoot regardless of whether I hit or miss. My shooting decreased the
probability of your death without this reducing the causal power of my
shot.37
These difficulties may not be decisive. Perhaps probability is a com-
ponent of a more complete causal theory. We might rely on the distinc-
tion between complete and incomplete causal chains introduced earlier
to respond to the first problem. And a more complex view about the rela-
tionship between probability and preemption might resolve the second.
Probabilistic theories also differ with different kinds of probability
or theories of probability. Epistemic Probability is a version of Causal Contri-
bution that relies on epistemic probabilities. Themetaphysical element of
this view is in one way less controversial, because it is less controversial
that epistemic probabilities exist. It is in another way more controversial.
The epistemic probability of my act causing an event depends on the ev-34. For a complex version of roughly this idea, see Alex Kaiserman, “Causal Contribu-
tion,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 116 (2016): 387–94.
35. For a defense of the view that different causal theories are needed for type and
token causal claims, see Ellery Eells, Probabilistic Causality (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1991).
36. See, for an overview and discussion, Christopher Hitchcock, “Probabilistic Causa-
tion,” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Stanford, CA: Stanford Uni-
versity), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/causation-probabilistic/.
37. Increasingly complex versions of probabilistic theories respond to concerns like
this. See, e.g., Eells, Probabilistic Causality, chap. 6; Judea Pearl, Causality: Models, Reasoning,
and Inference, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
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Aidence available tome. But, at least at first blush, causation does not seem
to depend on evidence in this way. For example, the epistemic probability
of my killing a person when I pull the trigger of a gun depends on my ev-
idence that the gun is loaded, but this does not seem to affect whethermy
pulling the trigger causes a death.
If causation does depend on evidence, Epistemic Probability is roughly
right. Here is why. The magnitude of a person’s liability to be harmed
depends on how culpable she is for posing a threat. The degree of a per-
son’s culpability for posing a threat sometimes depends on themagnitude
of the epistemic risk that she takes in posing the threat. If the magnitude
of a person’s causal contribution to a threat depends on themagnitude of
the epistemic risk that she takes in posing that threat, liability depends on
facts that determine the magnitude of a person’s causal contribution to
the threat.
Even if Epistemic Probability is true, it adds little to our understanding
of liability. The view that epistemic risk makes a difference to liability is
both familiar and intuitive, regardless of beliefs about the relationship
between epistemic risk and causation. We can safely bypass controversial
metaphysical views about the relationship between epistemic risk and cau-
sation, as those who write about risk in the ethics of war currently do.38
Objective Probability is a probabilistic version of Causal Contribution
that claims that the probabilities relevant to both causation and liability
are objective. This view is also metaphysically controversial, because it is
controversial whether the probability of one token event causing another
can be other than 0 or 1 in a deterministic world where all of the prop-
erties of the first token event are held constant.39 For example, suppose
that I flip a coin, which lands on heads. It is plausible that if the world is
deterministic, the probability that this coin flip, with all of its properties,
lands on heads is 1, and the probability that it lands on tails is 0.
Somemight respond that the world might not be deterministic. But
even if this is true, it is doubtful that liability depends on any kind of in-
determinacy that makes determinism false, such as quantum indetermi-38. See, e.g., Lazar, Sparing Civilians, chap. 4; Haque, Law andMorality at War, chaps. 5–
8; Victor Tadros, “Uncertainties of War,” in Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law, ed. John Gard-
ner, Leslie Green, and Brian Leiter, vol. 3 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming).
39. David Lewis, for example, thought it obvious that it cannot be. See David Lewis,
“Postscripts to ‘A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance,’” in Philosophical Papers, vol. 2
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 118–21. For a more developed skeptical analysis,
see Jonathan Schaffer, “Deterministic Chance?,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58
(2007): 113–40. Several attempts have been made to show that objective probability is com-
patible with determinism, but those working on probabilistic causation remain undecided.
See, e.g., Branden Fitelson and Christopher Hitchcock, “Probabilistic Measures of Causal
Strength,” in Causality in the Sciences, ed. Phyllis McKay Illari, Federica Russon, and Jon Wil-
liamson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 600–637.
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Anacy—is it hard to believe that when people lacked evidence for genuine
indeterminacy, their judgments of liability ought to have been different
from ours.
And even if there are objective probabilities, there is disagreement
about whether such probabilities make a difference to the magnitude of
causal contribution.40 Suppose that they do. Could these probabilities be
relevant to liability? To answer this question, we should consider pairs of
cases where some causally contributing event increases the probability of
its effect on any theory—that allows us to abstract from the complexities
of different probabilistic theories of causation. We can do this by consid-
ering simple cases that do not involve confounding factors, such as over-
determination, and by simply stipulating objective probability.
Furthermore, notice this distraction: differences that a person makes
to the objective probability of a threat occurring often track differences
in the probability that killing the person will make to averting the threat.
The second fact is often morally significant, but it provides no support for
Causal Contribution.
We can eliminate this distraction, and when we do, objective prob-
ability does not seem to affect liability. One way to eliminate it is to con-
sider cases where the fact that affected the likelihood of the outcome has
passed. Compare the following cases:4
Hand
ford:
ll use Auto Kill 1: Sheila wishes to kill Jake, who is on the other side of a
canyon, for no good reason. There is a safe bridge across the can-
yon, and Sheila knows that it is safe. She has a car that can be pro-
grammed to kill Jake. She programs it to cross the bridge and shoot
him. She gets in the car because she wants to make sure that Jake is
dead. It crosses the bridge, and it is about to shoot Jake. You can de-
stroy the car with Sheila in it.
Auto Kill 2: Same as Auto Kill 1, except that there is a high objective
probability that the bridge will collapse when the car crosses it. It
looks to Sheila exactly the same as the bridge in Auto Kill 1. The
car crosses the bridge, and it does not collapse.There is a high objective probability of Sheila killing Jake by program-
ming the car in Auto Kill 1, but only a low objective probability of her do-
ing so in Auto Kill 2. But there is an equal chance of eliminating the threat
by killing Sheila in both cases.
Suppose that differences in the objective probability of the threat
being posed as a result of Sheila programming the car make a difference0. See, for some discussion, Jon Williamson, “Probabilistic Theories,” in The Oxford
book of Causation, ed. Helen Beebee, Christopher Hitchcock, and Peter Menzies (Ox-
Oxford University Press, 2009), 185–212.
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Ato Sheila’s causal contribution in these cases. This seems to make little
difference to Sheila’s liability. She seems equally liable to be killed to save
Jake’s life in both cases. The same thing seems true if Sheila is less culpa-
ble, for example, if she is negligent about Jake’s liability to be killed, or
about whether her act will harm Jake.
Another way to eliminate distractions about the likelihood that harm-
ing the person will avert the threat is to compare cases where other things
are equal but the probabilities are epistemic in one case and objective in
the other. Compare the following:ll use Launch 1: There is a code to launch a missile that will pose a lethal
unjust threat. Sandra knows the whole code except the last number.
She is unsure whether that number is 0 or 1, and she has no more
reason to believe one or the other. She has only one chance to enter
the code. She is about to enter 0. Lucy has the same information as
Sandra and can harm her to prevent her from doing this.
Launch 2: Same as Launch 1, except that, unknown to Sandra and
Lucy, the last number is generated randomly by some indeterminis-
tic mechanism after the button is pressed, so that there is a .5 chance
that her entering 0 will launch the missile.In each case, the epistemic risk that Sandra will launch the missile, from
both her perspective and Lucy’s, is 50 percent. However, in the first case
the objective probability that she will launch the missile is either 1 or 0.
In the second case it is .5. The latter is true for all theories of objective
probability, whether or not objective probability is compatible with de-
terminism.
According to Objective Probability, if Sandra launches the missile, she
makes a larger causal contribution to the threat inLaunch 1 thanLaunch 2.
Obviously, if Sandra does not launch themissile, shemakes no causal con-
tribution to a threat. Objective Probability thus implies that Sandra is liable
to suffer a greater degree of harm to avert the risk of posing a lethal threat
in Launch 1 than in Launch 2. Here is why. If Sandra gets the right num-
ber, she makes a larger causal contribution to the threat in Launch 1 than
in Launch 2. If Sandra gets the wrong number, she makes no causal con-
tribution to the threat in either case. Hence, if Sandra is harmed, there
is a .5 epistemic chance that she will be prevented from making a larger
causal contribution to the threat in Launch 1 than in Launch 2 and a .5
epistemic chance that she will be prevented from making no causal con-
tribution to the threat in either case. If causal contributions matter to lia-
bility, it naturally follows that there are stronger reasons to kill Sandra in
Launch 1 than in Launch 2. But it is not intuitive that there is such a dif-
ference. This provides further support for the view thatObjective Probability
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ATo reinforce this conclusion, compare Launch 2 with the following:4
fensive
89, 82
(2013
4
Affair
4
ll use Launch 3: Same as Launch 2, except that the last number is ran-
domly generated prior to Sandra pressing the button.In Launch 3, Sandra pressing the right button is objectively certain to
launch the missile. Launch 3 is thus identical to Launch 1 with respect
to objective probability. Objective Probability thus implausibly implies that
the permissibility of killing Sandra depends on whether the last number
is randomly generated prior to or after her pressing the button.
Overall, even if the metaphysical claims that probabilistic views rest
on are sound, either they add nothing to our existing understanding of
liability, or they are false.
X. PROXIMITY
Proximity is a version of Causal Contribution that relies on the idea that the
causal contribution that one event makes to another depends on how
proximate these events are to each other. Voters, or those who tighten
the screws on tanks, or those whomanufacture weapons, aremuch earlier
in the causal chain that leads to the threats posed in war than those who
load and fire weapons. Proximity claims that these facts affect liability.
There might be both qualitative and quantitative aspects to proxim-
ity. The most familiar and important qualitative issue concerns wrongful
intervention.41 Elsewhere, I argue that wrongful intervention does not it-
self make a moral difference, and I will not repeat that argument here.42
But even if it makes a difference in some cases, it does not plausibly make
a difference where the first person intends the wrongful act of the second.
In that case, the second person is not truly a wrongful intervener at all—
their act is part of the first person’s plan. That is often true in war, where
noncombatants and combatants are part of a common enterprise.
Another possibility is that quantitative proximity to the threat makes
a difference to one’s liability to be harmed to avert that threat. Michael
Moore, for example, claims that causation is not transitive—the fact that
E1 causes E2 and E2 causes O does not imply that E1 causes O.43 This is
so, Moore believes, because whether E1 causes O depends on the num-
ber of events in the chain between E1 andO. Itmight also be claimed that1. See, e.g., David Rodin, “The Myth of National Self-Defence,” in The Morality of De-
War, ed. Cécile Fabre and Seth Lazar (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 69–
; Jeff McMahan, “Proportionate Defense,” Journal of Transnational Law and Policy 23
–14): 1–36, 36; Frowe, Defensive Killing, chap. 5.
2. See Victor Tadros, “Permissibility in a World of Wrongdoing,” Philosophy and Public
s 44 (2016): 101–32.
3. See Moore, Causation and Responsibility, 155.
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Athe causal contribution that one event makes to another depends on
proximity.
This view is hard to vindicate. As Helen Beebee notes, events can be
subdivided into further events. There may be no principled way to avoid
infinite subdivisions.44 For example, starting a car involves turning a key.
Turning a key involves an infinite number of infinitesimally small turns.
So starting a car involves an infinite number of events. We might rely on
intuitive judgments about the length of causal chains—we do, after all,
seem able confidently to make claims about proximity and remoteness.
The problem of individuating events may well not be lethal to the idea of
proximity and remoteness.
Even if this concern can be met, though, Proximity has counterintu-
itive implications. Where there is a chain of events that leads to a threat
of harm and all other things are held equal, I doubt that it matters to a
person’s liability where in the chain the person’s act occurs.45
Consider the following:4
4
ll use Pass : a chain of combatants passes a weapon to the front line, where
it will be used to kill an innocent person.On the view under consideration, the magnitude of harm that those in
the chain are liable to suffer depends on where in the chain they are, but
this does not seem true. If there is a reason to harm those later in the
chain rather than earlier, this is best explained by the fact that there is a
greater likelihood that the munitions will get to the front line the farther
down the chain they get.
Or consider this slightly different case:Flood : One hundred people wish to cause a flood, which will devas-
tate a village. To do so, they need to remove a flood-defense barrier.
They can do so by firing rockets at it. If one hundred rockets hit the
barrier, it will break, and the village will be flooded. Each of the one
hundred people has a rocket. D can prevent the flood from occur-
ring by killing any of the one hundred. He knows the order in which
they will fire their rockets.Thefiringof the first rocket ismore remote from the villagebeingflooded
than the firing of the last rocket. The view that remoteness makes a dif-
ference to liability implies that D has a reason to kill the person who will
fire his rocket last. But again, any such reason that D has is best explained
by the fact that the probability of the threat occurring if D does not shoot
a person increases as more rockets are fired. Even if D has a reason to4. Beebee, “Legal Responsibility and Scalar Causation,” 106–7.
5. See also McMahan, “Basis of Moral Liability,” 396.
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Akill the last person in the chain, each person seems liable to be killed to
avert the threat to the village where only killing this person can avert the
threat.
And our judgments are no different if culpability is reduced. Make
those who fire the rockets negligent about whether the people in the vil-
lage are liable to be killed, or about whether the village will be flooded,
and the view that D should harm the last person in the chain seems no
more plausible.
XI. CONCLUSION
If their metaphysical claims can be vindicated, some versions of Causal
Contribution seem true. For example, Personhood and Epistemic Probability
both seem true. But they do not offer us something distinct from familiar
ideas in moral philosophy. At most they clarify and deepen our under-
standing of these familiar ideas. Other versions of Causal Contribution
seem false, both because the metaphysical ideas on which they rest are
fishy and, more importantly, because they do not seem morally plausi-
ble. This is true of Portion of the Cause, Enabling, Lewis-Style Influence, and
Objective Probability. Still other versions merit a more complex response.
There is room for doubt about whether Portion of the Threat is true. And
althoughOverdetermination is false, we have seen that overdetermination
can affect justification and that it can, for that reason, affect liability.
Some unjust noncombatants, as well as some unjust combatants, are
not liable to be killed to avert the threats they contribute to, and that
may be in part because of the size of the causal contribution they make
to these threats. But there is little support to be found here for a more
general principle of noncombatant immunity.
Inmore recent work, Fabre suggests that a mix of causal ideas might
do the job.46 Given the familiar idea that contextual interaction is mor-
ally significant, we should not reject out of hand the idea that a causal
fact has moral significance only when it interacts with some other causal
fact. But I doubt that contextual interaction is significant in this case. At
least, I am not sure how to make progress with the suggestion.
Some might respond that the arguments offered must be wrong be-
cause they conflict with the brute intuition that many noncombatants
contribute too little to wars tomake them liable to be killed.47 I doubt that
this is right. Our intuitions may be justified in part because causal facts
often coincide with other facts that aremorally significant, such as episte-
mic risk and the probability of success in averting threats. Furthermore,
we have good reason not to rely too heavily on brute intuitions of this46. See Fabre, Cosmopolitan Peace, 6.
47. Fabre continues to endorse Causal Contribution for roughly this reason. See ibid.
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Akind. Such intuitions are likely to be influenced by a very wide range of
facts about noncombatants, such as facts to do with culpability. And they
are likely to be influenced by the powerful, but recent, trend of seeing
the targeting of noncombatants as abhorrent. However, this trend is best
explained by abhorrence of killing noncombatants to influence govern-
ments by terrorizing the population. Abhorrence of this practicemaywell
be justified, but it should not lead us to abhorrence of the targeting of
noncombatants to prevent them from causing unjust threats.
It does not seem abhorrent to target many noncombatants who are
wrongly involved in weapons production, ormilitary training, or research
and design, to prevent them from contributing to unjust wars where this
will save an equal number of noncombatants who are completely inno-
cent from the lethal threats they will otherwise face. Prior to careful re-
flection, the view that this is permissible is plausible enough, as is the view
that it is wrong. Which view we should ultimately accept depends on our
assessment of moral principles like Causal Contribution.This content downloaded from 035.176.047.006 on January 22, 2018 03:41:13 AM
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